From the India Today archives (1991) | More bang for India’s defence bucks

(NOTE: This article was published in the INDIA TODAY edition dated December 31, 1991)

In real terms, the defence budget has been going down over the past few years. The apparent increases in terms of the current rupee have not even covered the loss of real value due to inflation. I do not see any dramatic change in this trend for some more years to come. The bulk of the present budget goes towards expenses on personnel, especially in the army, and towards maintenance expenditure. There is little for modernisation of equipment including essential replacements for retiring equipment.

The availability of Soviet equipment at reasonable prices and on rupee payment is a thing of the past. Under the circumstances, it is natural that various means are canvassed which might get us over this difficult period without compromising on our defence effectiveness.

In this process, there are a few solutions being suggested which I believe are downright dangerous. One such is easing up on our R&D expenditure on some hi-tech equipment like the light combat aircraft and the Arjun main battle tank. There are various schools of thought which are pushing in this direction. One is an anti-defence R&D lobby which, in Parliament and the press, has been demanding the closure of these projects. Some believe our scientists are incapable of producing goods of the required quality and that money is being poured into a bottomless pit, while the deadline for production will continue to be postponed indefinitely.

A few are interested more in imports which provide better pickings than production at home. Others believe that even if these are successfully produced, the post would be very high due to technological sophistication and the lack of economics of scale. Thus it would be impossible to buy anywhere near enough with a tight budget: the best solution would be to continue obtaining more of the current generation of equipment by production at home or import from abroad.

Mysteriously, this kind of affliction has also affected our successful missile programme. There have been no great time and cost overruns nor have there been unfulfilled promises on the part of our scientists, yet there is reluctance to place orders for these. The kindest construction to place on this state of affairs is that it is due to the money crunch.

The Soviet Union no longer being an economical source of supply for sophisticated arms leaves the US and Western Europe almost the sole suppliers of hi-tech equipment. With the experience of the so-called missile control regime, one may expect more cooperation among these countries in denying even other hi-tech weapons systems to Third World countries, particularly those seen as having the potential to stand up to the West in regional matters. This is not the time to give up our quest for self-reliance (not self-sufficiency) in defence production. On the contrary, I suggest we increase our effort in this direction. We must bring designs to fruition and seal them after troop trials are carried out with an adequate number of equipment in order to infuse confidence in the user. If ordnance factories cannot afford to go into series production due to the lack of orders, so be it. But to stop research, development, and design only because of this reason would be self-inflicted injury.

Trying to maintain forces at current levels with depleting finances in real terms would only lead to aging and unreliable weapons and equipment. This would erode combat power and make nonsense out of maintaining high force levels. Any attempts at cheese-paring at current force levels, and the usual belt-tightening exercises will not solve the problem. I would go to the extent of saying that even very comprehensive exercises carried out by the most competent of groups cannot find a solution as long as current force levels are sacrosanct.

I think that for continental defence, India, China and Pakistan can maintain the current kind of inter se balance in land and air forces but at much lower levels than at present. This cannot but be of benefit to all three countries. Admittedly, how much lower could this level be, would be a function of the degree of mutual trust. This can be built up over a period of time and levels could be adjusted downwards as trust increases. But this does not mean one must wait for a very cordial atmosphere before talks even start. One is not suggesting that one should let one's guard down very drastically or very suddenly, only gradually. The very act of talking and coming to agree to even a small reduction can have a catalytic effect in improving the levels of trust. This will give a fillip to seeking still better relations.

I have kept the navies of all three countries out of this proposition as they are not related to the force levels of each other. They will have to take into account threats from all quarters and of all the conventional forces—navies are what have true strategic reach today, not armies and tactical air forces. Airborne forces have strategic reach but are vulnerable except in low intensity war situations. Hence naval threats cannot be confined to those from neighbours only.

Nuclear forces are in a different class altogether. Mutual talks are necessary to maintain a low but adequate level of minimum or proportionate difference and to avoid nuclear arms racing. But that is a more complicated issue considering China is the only declared nuclear weapon power of the three. But talks on conventional arms limitation need not and should not wait for the nuclear Gordian knot to be cut.

(The article was published in the INDIA TODAY edition dated December 31, 1991)

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